

VZCZCXRO1628
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1699/01 1990721
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180721Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0021
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3743
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTJF HOA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001699

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D, AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO
BRUSSELS FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AMB HUME

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016
TAGS: [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [MARR](#) [AU](#) [UN](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: UNSR PRONK CONSULTS WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
ON DARFUR

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: During a July 15 consultation with the diplomatic community, UN Special Representative Jan Pronk characterized AMIS as weak and unable to address the realities in Darfur, which now featured fighting among SLM factions. He faulted the Ceasefire Commission and said that Darfur Peace Agreement implementation would be difficult under present circumstances. Participants called for international community solidarity in support for a UN peacekeeping operation. CDA Hume noted the reported incursion of Chadian forces in North Darfur and cited this as a violation of international law that should be taken up by the Ceasefire Commission; unfortunately, it does not carry out its role. The Sudanese Government is starting to realize that if AMIS departs and a UN peacekeeping operation is not in place, it stands to be blamed for the outcome. While AU representatives spoke in defense of AMIS, donors were unconvinced of its ability to protect civilians in Darfur. End summary.

Pronk: No Change in Sudan's Views, Options Mulled

¶2. (C) In a July 15 consultation with the diplomatic community, UN Special Representative Jan Pronk noted no change in Sudan's attitude since the time of recent UN and AU delegation visits. Questioning the possibility of an opportunity to convince Sudan of the need for a UN peacekeeping operation (PKO), he said that in the absence of a UN PKO, Plan B would be to strengthen the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). A third approach would be for the AMIS mandate to be extended by six months with its current structures in place to buy additional time; a fourth one would be, if Sudan were to change its mind, to strive to strengthen AMIS) better trained troops and a stronger mandate pending a UN PKO transition. In the end, he noted that more than six months may be needed to change the Sudanese Government's point of view.

Pronk Characterizes Changing Nature of Conflict

¶3. (C) Following the May 5 signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), Pronk said, militia attacks increased; however, since mid-June, fighting has involve clashes between SLA factions, especially in disputed areas. This has led to increased displacement of people and human rights violations, which Pronk likened to earlier acts of militias. The recent emergence of the G-19 faction and attacks on SLM/Minawi's northern areas, such as Muzbat and Birmaza, reflect strong

challenges to Minni's support, which he said is slipping. Although information is unclear as to who is attacking whom, the level of violence in several areas of North Darfur is increasing. Pronk mentioned reports of vehicles entering Darfur from Chad and attempts to open a corridor from Chad through to Muzbat and Birmaza and possibly further east.

¶4. (C) Pronk said he believed the Sudanese Government had used Antonov aircraft and helicopter gunships in recent incidents; he added hearing disconcerting rumors of white helicopters marked AMIS being seen in the vicinity of recent fighting. People have said that AMIS is taking sides; he had hence asked AMIS to ensure that it was fully clear, independent, and neutral in its operations to avoid such accusations.

Pronk: CFC Weak, DPA Implementation Difficult

¶5. (C) Pronk said that the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) was to address all violations, and to demarcate and verify zones of control, none of which are taking place. Positions on the ground are changing in the absence of verification, making DPA implementation extremely difficult. It is hence important to broaden the base of support for the DPA. Pronk noted that neither he nor the Government of Eritrea has been able to meet with Abdel Wahid to try to convince him to support the DPA.

Diplomats Concur on Need for UN PKO, DPA Support

¶6. (C) Diplomats made the following points:

-- Netherlands: underscored the importance of the Darfur

KHARTOUM 00001699 002 OF 003

Joint Assessment Mission (D-JAM) to securing lasting peace in Darfur. Also, that the international community needed to be solid in pressing for the UN;

-- UK: agreed the international community needed to present a united front in support of UN peacekeeping, versus discussing alternatives. There is only one way forward) a UN PKO; the international community should recall that the GNU is a coalition, with the SPLM favoring UN entry. A Chapter VIII mandate is a not satisfactory solution; both President Bashir and the Arab League should be told there is no alternative to a UN PKO. Sudan should participate in a six-month plan to strengthen Darfur security for a UN handover from AMIS;

-- Egypt: the tragic circumstances in the Middle East at present do not give time or space for Sudan to consider matters in Darfur in perspective; Sudan is occupied with the explosive situation. The Arab League is hoping for solidarity with the international community, but the Arab world "man on the street" needed convincing. The Arab League has consulted at high levels on Darfur, and supports AMIS;

-- The AU Deputy Head of Mission said it is in consultation on a new Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for AMIS. The AU will decide on a way forward, but needs capacity to support the DPA and introduce a new CONOPS. The AU plans to call a meeting for the international community to explain what it has been doing. She added that AMIS is doing a good job within its capacity constraints, and that it has endured a difficult time and had lost troops in the line of service;

-- U.S.: Charge Hume reminded participants that the UNSC team that had visited Sudan recently offered the opinions of its representatives, not a decision of the Security Council itself. Discussion on a Chapter VII mandate in Darfur needs much consideration; peacekeeping there must look like that in the South. Discussion of the ICC is a risky bet; what is important is to protect civilians. There are reports of 34

vehicles entering Sudan from Chad to attack SLM/Minawi forces; this represents a violation of international borders and is against the law. AMIS does not have the capacity to do everything called for in the DPA; on the other hand, it can call a meeting of the CFC) wherein the Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander attend) and draw up maps reflecting rebel zones. AMIS can use armored personnel carriers to patrol, including the highway between El Fasher and Nyala to cut the number of clashes. None of this, however, is being done. He questioned what level of donor support this would generate in the absence of such activities. AU Special Representative Kingibe has said AMIS would end on September 30. What will happen if the DPA fails because Sudan will not allow the UN to give assistance? Who will be blamed? At least some in the GNU are thinking about this; many are aware that Sudan has painted itself in a corner and needs a way out;

-- Norway: characterized the AU as weak, and cited a need for factual reporting; the circulation of rumors about the security situation in Darfur is not assisting in implementation of the DPA. Also, work needs to be done on Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process and to address intertribal tensions;

-- Canada: agreed with the goal of re-hatting AMIS, but focused also on the next six months, during which AMIS must be strengthened. AMIS is in Darfur to monitor a ceasefire, and is not a UN PKO with significant levels of financing and planning resources; and

-- Italy: emphasized different levels of acceptance of the Darfur situation; few in the SPLM spoke out on Darfur-related issues, despite three years of violence.

Pronk: AMIS Weak, Reached its Limits

17. (C) Pronk said that AMIS is weak, and is not strengthening itself. Two patrols were stopped recently, with some personnel being held. An AMIS helicopter was nearly missed by a missed. AMIS has reached its limits; it is not making progress. The CFC is not investigating in the many violations taking place. An AU representative took offense at this characterization, and countered that AMIS had experienced problems on the ground, but held discussions with UNMIS weekly, and accepted its advice.

KHARTOUM 00001699 003 OF 003

18. (C) Pronk closed the two-house session with a call for the international community to stay united and to continue listening to each other. Pronk also suggested a follow-on meeting after the Brussels conference.
STEINFELD